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RASER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., by and through
Houston Phoenix Group, LLC as its Attorney-inFact; THOMAS COLLENTINE, JR., JUDITH
COLLENTINE, CHARLES FAIRES, SANDRA
FAIRES, STEPHEN E. HART, LORI F. HART,
ALAN S. LISENBY, WILLIAM McALA VANY,
JOANN McALA VANY, EUGENE TIFFIN,
TIFFIN, INC., ROBERT BAIR, JEFFREY
ESFELD, MICHAEL ESFELD, SIGRID ESFELD,
JAMES BAKER, JR., ROBERT BAKER,
RICHARD HASKELL, SUSAN S. HASKELL,
WILLIAM BURNSIDE, ROBERT KORNFELD,
RICHARD BURHMAN, as Trustee of the
Charitable Remainder Unit rust Agreement of
Wesley W. Cash, Sr., JANE MAJ, RONALD G.
MAY, DONNA CASH, as Executor of the Estate of
Dorthy Connelly, JUDy MUNZI, MARK
SANSOM, GARY SCHUSTER, CHESTER
SCOTT, JOHN SCOTT, PHILLIPS W. SMITH,
KELL Y TRIMBLE, OCEAN FUND, LLC,
WARNER INVESTMENTS, LLC, MAASSI, INC.,
RONALD WINCHELL, JOAN W. WINCHELL, as
Trustee of Winchell Nonexempt Terminable Trust,
DOUG WIVIOTT, and MARCIA WIVIOTT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FEB 262014
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY, GA

Civil Action File No.
2012CV214140

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

)
)

MORGAN STANLEY & CO., LLC, GOLDMAN
SACHS & CO., LP, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH, INC., UBS SECURITIES,
LLC, AND [ABC CORPORATIONS],

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended Complaint, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Upon consideration of the briefs on the motions and the
record of the case, this Court finds as follows:

Plaintiffs' allege that Defendants Morgan Stanley & Co., Goldman Sachs & Co., Men-ill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and UBS Securities, LLC manipulated the price of Plaintiff
Raser Technologies, Inc. ("Raser") common stock by engaging in "naked" short sales, which
refers to the failure of a trader to borrow or arrange to borrow a security within the requisite time
frame following a short sale. See Hyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge Capital Management,
LLC, 305 Ga. App. 283, 287 n. 8 (2010)
Raser had its stock delisted from the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") on November
3, 2010, and subsequently filed for bankruptcy in April 2011, when its stock price fell below $1
per share. Twenty-nine Plaintiffs are individuals who allegedly purchased and sold Raser stock
between 2003 and 2011. Eleven Plaintiffs are Georgia residents. The Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants' conduct resulted in counterfeit shares that allegedly depressed the price of Raser
stock between 2003 and 2011.
On April 20, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this action, asserting claims against Defendants for
Violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO") Act;
Violation of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, repealed, and the Georgia Securities Act of
2008; Violation of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act; Money Had and Received;
and Civil Conspiracy.
On July 11,2013, this Court entered the Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (the
"Order"), dismissing the following claims with prejudice: 1) Plaintiffs' securities claims
premised on the 1973 Act; 2) Plaintiffs' claims for the sale of unregistered securities; 3)
Plaintiffs' claims based on the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act; 4) Plaintiffs' claims

Pursuant to the Consent Order Dismissing Certain Claims of Plaintiff Raser Technologies, Inc. entered on January
23,2013, Raser's claims against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. stand dismissed.
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for money had and received; 5) Plaintiffs' claims under Georgia RICO predicated on theft by
taking/theft by deception and the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act; and 6) NonGeorgia Plaintiffs' claims for civil conspiracy.

Finding that the doctrine of lex loci delecti

governed Plaintiffs' statutory claims, the Court ruled that the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs were
permitted to re-plead securities and RICO claims based on the laws of their respective home
states.
On August 19, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Amendments to First Amended Complaint
("Amended Complaint"), asserting Georgia-based racketeering claims by Plaintiffs who resided
in Tennessee, New York, South Carolina, Illinois, Arizona, Washington, Utah, Florida and Ohio.
The Amended Complaint also asserts claims based on Nevada's racketeering statute, are-plead
claim for civil conspiracy, and punitive damages.
Along with the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration: 1)
Asking the Court to modify its Order to confirm that it was not foreclosing Plaintiffs' right to
plead the public policy exception of the lex loci delicti choice of law rule; and 2) Seeking the
Court's reconsideration of its ruling dismissing the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' conspiracy and
Georgia RICO claims. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended
Complaint to Add Plaintiffs from the States of Illinois and Colorado, seeking permission to add
three additional plaintiffs from those states. Finally, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' Claims. Because the relief sought in Plaintiffs' motions is intertwined
with the Court's ruling on Defendants' motion, the Court will first address Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss.
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1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' Claims

"A motion to dismiss should only be granted if the allegations of the complaint,
construed most favorably to the plaintiff, disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be
entitled to relief under any state of provable facts. Stated somewhat differently, a motion to
dismiss should not be granted unless the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly
introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the
reliefsought." Thomas v. Lee, 286 Ga. App. 860, 861 (2010).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs repackage Georgia RICO claims by pleading the
public policy exception to lex loci delecti as applied to Non-Georgia Plaintiffs residing in
Tennessee, New York, South Carolina, Illinois, Arizona, Washington, Utah, Florida and Ohio.
Defendants move the Court to dismiss these claims, arguing, among other things, that Georgia
lacks a public policy interest in the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' claims and that such an exercise of
Georgia authority would offend the U.S. Constitution.
"Under the rule of lex loci delicti, tort cases are governed by the substantive law of the
state where the tOli was committed." Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Distrib. Co., 203 Ga. App. 763
(1992). In the Order, the COUli determined that the lex loci delicti analysis rendered the NonGeorgia Plaintiffs' claims subject to the laws of their home states. However, "[ e]ven if an
application of [lex loci delicti] renders the law of another state applicable, the forum, within
constitutional limits, is not required to give the law of another state extra-territorial effect. That is
only done as a matter of courtesy or comity, which will not be enforced if the law of the other
state contravenes the public policy of the forum." Id. at 766.
The Non-Georgia Plaintiffs argue that the application of Georgia law is mandated for
certain Non-Georgia Plaintiffs because the state laws applicable to them significantly differ from
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Georgia's statutory racketeering scheme and therefore, amount to violations of Georgia public
policy. As an initial matter, before delving into any specific policy issues that may be triggered
by the racketeering statutes of other states, the Court finds it appropriate to evaluate Georgia's
interest in this dispute, both from a public policy perspective and in order to determine the
constitutional limitations on the application of Georgia law.
The Supreme Court visited the constitutional restrictions on a forum state's ability to
apply its laws to extraterritorial claims in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
There, the Supreme Court considered whether Kansas law could constitutionally govern a class
action involving claims made by a majority of non-Kansas residents concerning gas leases that
had little connection to Kansas. Concluding that Kansas law would violate the due process and
full faith and credit clause, the Supreme Court explained that the forum state must have
"significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member
of the plaintiff class, contacts creating state interests, in order to ensure that the choice of the
forum's law is not arbitrary or unfair." Id., at 821-822.
Here, the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs ask this COUl1 to find, for purposes of making the public
policy exception to the rule of lex loci delicti, that Georgia has "a substantial interest in
regulating the conduct in the claims asserted." See Amended Complaint. As support, NonGeorgia Plaintiffs direct the COUl1 to consider allegations of Defendants' conduct that allegedly
took place in Georgia. As alleged, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants engaged in the following
activities in Georgia:
•

Unlawful naked short sale transactions were initiated in Georgia or were undertaken on
behalf of Georgia residents;

•

On information and belief, artificial and/or phantom Raser shares were bought, sold or
delivered in Georgia;
5
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•

Defendants sent money to or received money from Georgia in connection with the
purchase, sale, loan or other transfer of Raser stock;

•

Documents relating to Raser were sent to or received from Georgia; and

•

Many of the Defendants' Atlanta, Georgia offices were involved in the purchase, sale
loan or borrowing of Raser stock.

Additionally, each Defendant is alleged to have:
•

Maintained an office in Georgia;

•

Conducted business in Georgia;

•

Purchased or sold Raser common stock from a person in Georgia;

•

Borrowed Raser C01mnon stock from a person in Georgia;

•

Sent or received correspondence regarding Raser stock or options from its Atlanta,
Georgia office;

•

Requested facilitated or engaged in short sales of Raser common stock from its Atlanta,
Georgia office;

•

Sent or received information pertaining to a Sh01i sale of Raser common stock from its
Atlanta, Georgia office;

•

Received fees, commissions, interest or other monies from a person in Georgia in
connection with the purchase or sale of Raser common stock;

•

Purchased or sold Raser common stock from its Atlanta, Georgia office;

•

Wired or otherwise electronically transferred money to Georgia relating to the purchase,
sale, loan or borrowing of Raser common stock or options;

•

Received a wire or other electronic transfer of money from Georgia relating to the
purchase, sale, loan or bon-owing of Raser common stock or options; and

•

Borrowed Raser stock from a person in Georgia.
In contrast to a personal jurisdiction analysis, which requires a finding that a particular

defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, I-Iyperdynamics Corp. v. Southridge
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Capital Management, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 283 (2010),

due process requires that a forum state

have a significant relationship with the claims. See Kirkpatrick v. I.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d

718 (11

til

Cir. 1987) ("[T]he law of Georgia could be applied consistent with due process only if

the particular transaction had some significant relation to Georgia."). While Plaintiffs'
allegations establish a relationship to Georgia and support Georgia's connection to claims
brought by Georgia residents, the COUli is unable to ascertain a significant constellation of
activity in Georgia, unique to the claims of the individual Non-Georgia Plaintiffs, to satisfy the
Supreme Court's mandate in Shutts.
To establish a sufficient state interest, Shutts requires that a state have "significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member of the
plaintiff class." Id. at 821-822

(emphasis added). The Court interprets this to require each Non-

Georgia Plaintiffto allege a specific and independent connection to Georgia, rather than piggyback on generalized allegations of harm suffered by Georgia Plaintiffs or cite to unrelated
contacts Defendants happen to maintain to Georgia. Non-Georgia Plaintiffs have failed to make
such a showing. In any event, the COUli is not persuaded that Georgia's interest in the NonGeorgia Plaintiffs' claims warrants the imposition of the policy exception to the lex loci delicti
analysis. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the Non-Georgia Defendants'
Georgia RICO claims. To the extent a racketeering claim is available under the law of the NonGeorgia Plaintiffs' forum state, the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs may re-plead within a reasonable
amount of time.
Tuming to Defendants' next argument, Defendants contend that the Nevada Plaintiffs
fail to satisfy the pleading standard required to maintain a RICO claim under Nevada law. While
it is true that Nevada courts have directed RICO claimants to plead RICO violations with "the
7
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same degree of specificity called for as in a criminal indictment ," see Hale v. Burkhardt, 104
Nev. 632, 638 (1988), courts also recognize that a balance must be struck "between providing
adequate notice to the adverse party while at the same time not effectively requiring prediscovery."

G.K. Las Vegas Limited Partnership v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 460 F.Supp.2d

1222 (D. Nev. 2006).

The Nevada Plaintiffs' RICO claim is premised, in part, on NRS § 90.570, which
prohibits a person in connection with the "offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase or purchase" of a
security, directly or indirectly, to "(1) [e]mploy any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (2)
[mJake an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made not misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made; or (3) [e]ngage in an act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon a person."
Here, by pleading that the Defendants have "created false documentation regarding their
trading, loaning and ownership of Raser stock by creating mismarked order tickets to make
transactions appear as long sales when, in fact, they are short sales;" "submit[ ed] fake short
interest and other reports to regulators;" and "falsely represent[ ed] that they either possessed the
borrowed securities or had located them for bon-owing and delivery," the Court finds that the
Nevada Plaintiffs have specified sufficient grounds on which to raise an inference of fraud. See
Rocker v. KPMG LLP, 122 Nev. 1185, 1187 (2006) (reversed on other grounds). Accordingly,
because the Court concludes that the facts necessary for appellants to plead with greater
particularity are peculiarly within Defendants' knowledge, "the plaintiff should have all
opportunity to conduct discovery and amend his complaint to include the particular facts."
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Rocker, 122 Nev. at 1187. The Court also finds sufficient the Nevada Plaintiffs' allegations of
the enterprise and proximate cause elements of the RICO claims.

Accordingly, Defendants'

motion is DENIED on those grounds.

As to the Nevada Plaintiffs' RICO claims premised on violations of federal securities law
and NRS § 90-580, the Court accepts Defendants' challenge that these statutes cannot form
predicate acts under NRS § 207.360, as neither is specifically listed as a "crime related to
racketeering." Defendants' motion is GRANTED to the extent the Nevada Plaintiffs' RICO
claim relies on those predicate acts.
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's July 11,2013 Order
Dismissing the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' RICO and Conspiracy Claims

Plaintiffs ask the COUli to reconsider its July 11, 2013 Order (the "Order") to clarify that
Plaintiffs are permitted to make allegations in the Amendments to First Amended Complaint that
the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti doctrine requires application of Georgia law,
rather than the law of certain Non-Georgia Plaintiffs' home states.
As set forth above, the Court has addressed on the merits the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs'
allegations regarding the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti doctrine. Accordingly,
because the COUli has found that Georgia lacks a sufficient interest in the Non-Georgia
Plaintiffs' claims to invoke Georgia public policy without offending the U.S. Constitution, the
Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion as moot. The Court further declines to reconsider the NonGeorgia Plaintiffs' argument that Georgia's RICO statute is intended to provide a remedy to the
Non-Georgia Plaintiffs due to allegations that Defendants' engaged in a pattern of racketeering
in Georgia. For the reasons set forth in the Order, this argument lacks the weight of authority
and would undermine Georgia's choice of law jurisprudence.
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Finally, the Court stands by its analysis of Brenner v. Future Graphics, LLC, 258 F.R.D.
561 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Plaintiffs point out that Georgia law governs the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs'
claims for civil conspiracy.

See Brenner, at 571 ("Georgia's choice oflaw system, however, has

an unusual characteristic: the application of another jurisdiction'S laws is limited to statutes and
decisions construing those statutes. When no statute is involved, Georgia courts apply the
common law as developed in Georgia rather than foreign case law."). The Court agrees.
However, to plead a conspiracy claim under Georgia law, the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs must allege
that "two or more persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort." Id.
Because the Court found that the Non-Georgia Plaintiffs did not have an actionable Georgia
RICO claim, the COUli ruled that their conspiracy claim fails due to the inability to satisfy the
elements of a conspiracy claim under Georgia law. The Brelmer decision does not compel the
Court to adopt the approach that Plaintiffs suggest, even if the Court was able to extract by
implication the Brenner Court's support of a civil conspiracy claim premised on Georgia RICO
violations.

In any event, the Brenner Court was not sitting in a motion to dismiss posture.

Therefore, in contrast to this case, the Georgia RICO claims alleged in Brenner were still in play
and could serve as a "tort" necessary to satisfy the elements of a conspiracy claim under Georgia
law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended Complaint to Add
Plaintiffs from the States of Illinois and Colorado

Plaintiffs seek leave of court to add two additional plaintiffs from Illinois to Count Nine
of the First Amended Complaint and to add an additional claim under Colorado's racketeering
statute by one additional plaintiff from Colorado. Considering the Court's ruling above

10
Raser Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., et al.
CAFN 2012CV214140
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

dismissing the Georgia RICO claims asserted by Illinois Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' request is DENIED
with respect to the proposed additional Illinois plaintiffs.
With regard to the amendment concerning the Colorado claim, Defendants oppose this
request, arguing that it is untimely and futile because the statute of limitations has lapsed and the
claim otherwise fails on the merits.
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15,

"[wjhenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended

pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading" for
statute of limitations purposes. Defendants argue that the relation back doctrine can not be
invoked by "strangers to the action." See Beaver v. Steinichen, 182 Ga. App. 303 (1987).
However, the COUli finds Defendants' authority unavailing.

In Beaver v. Steinichen, the plaintiff

attempted to add new defendants past the expiration of the statute of limitations.

In contrast, the

issue currently before the Court is the addition of a plaintiff, and such request is adjudicated with
a lighter hand pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c).

The Court finds no compelling reason under

Georgia law to deny Plaintiffs' request on this ground.
Turning to Defendants' complaints regarding the timing of Plaintiffs' request, the COUli
acknowledges that Plaintiffs' motion comes after the expiration for the filing of preliminary
motions, including motions to add parties, under the Case Management Order. However, given
the impact of the Court's rulings on Plaintiffs' theory of the case (the availability ofa cause of
action under Georgia's RICO statute for non-Georgia Plaintiffs), the Court will exercise its
discretion to sustain Plaintiffs' request to add the Colorado Plaintiff and will likewise entertain
reasonable modifications to the Case Management Order to accommodate any extension
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requested by Defendants.

As to the substantive

arguments

in opposition to the addition of the

Colorado Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to rebut the presumption
of Plaintiffs at the pleading stage.

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs'

in favor

motion is GRANTED as to the

addition of the Colorado Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED this ;2..,

It day of February, 2014.
JO
Sup
ton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Copies to:

Attorneys' for Plaintiffs

Attorneys for Defendants

Mark F. Dehler
MARK F. DEHLER, LLC
345 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 159
Hiawassee, GA 30546
Tel: (706) 896-4332
mark@dehlerlaw.com
Of Counsel:
Joe E. Luce
James W. Christian
CHRISTIAN, SMITH, & JEWELL, LLP
2302 Fannin, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel: (713) 659-7616
Fax: (713) 659-7641
jluce@csj-Iaw.com
jchristian@csj-Iaw.com
Jimmy L. Paul

Richard H. Sinkfield
Dan F. Laney
James W. Cobb
ROGERS & HARDIN LLP
2700 International Tower
Peachtree Center
2299 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
rsinkfield@rh-Iaw.com
d laney@rh-Iaw.com
jcobb@rh-law.com
Attorneys for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fennel' &
Smith Incorporated
Andrew J. Frankman
Abby F. Rudzin
Brad M. Elias
O'MEL VENY & MYERS LLP
Times Square Tower
7 Times Square
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David N. Dreyer
Scott Michael Ratchick
CHAMBERLAIN, HRDLICKA, WHITE,
WILLIAMS & AUGHTRY
191 Peachtree Street, N.E.
34th Floor
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
jimmy. paul@chamberlainlaw.com
david.dreyer@chamberlainlaw.com
scott.ratchick@chamberlainlaw.com
Alam M. Pollock
John D. D'Ercole
ROBINSON BROG LEINW AND AND GREENE
GENOVESE & GLUCK P.C.
875 Third Avenue, 9th Floor
New York, New York 10022
amp@robinsonbrog.com
jdd@robinsonbrog.com

New York, New York 10036
afrackman@omm.com
arudzin@omm.com
belias@omm.com

Attorneys for Goldman, Sachs & Co. LLC
Richard C. Pepperman, II
John G. Mcf.arthy
SULLIV AN & CROMWELL LLP
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
peppermanr@sullcrom.com
mccalthyj@sullcrom.com

Attorneys for Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
Jami Johnson
Robert F. Wise, Jr.
Stefani L. Johnson
William D. Pollack
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELLLLP
450 Lexington A venue
New York, New York 10017
jamijohnson@davispolk.com
robert.wisergjdavispolk.com
stefani.johnson@davispolk.com
william.poUak@davispolk.com

Attorneys for UBS Securities, LLC
Susan E. Engel
Jeffrey M. Gould
Daviel J. Gomez
Beth A. Williams
Stephen S. Schwartz
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington DC 20005
susan.engel@kirkland.com
jeffrey.gould@kirkland.com
daniel.gomez@kirkland.com
beth.williams@kirkland.com
stephen.schwartz@kirkland.com
Andrew B. Clubok
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
601 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022-4611

andrew.clubokrdikirkland.corn
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